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Abstract
Justice requires that high consumption in affluent societies be slowed down for the sake of eradicating
extreme poverty in the developing world and improving the condition of its very moderate
consumers. High consumption places environmental and resource burdens and restrictions on the
economic growth options of developing countries without bringing commensurate benefits.
Moreover, high consumers enjoy products made in less developed countries by workers who have
inadequate wages and often labor in unhealthy and unsafe conditions.
Contemporary high consumption is characterized by a continuous raising of the standards of
satisfactory spending. This process is visible in many American consumption patterns: Middle-class
Americans live in significantly larger homes with more bathrooms than only a few decades ago, drive
cars with more gadgets, buy ever more fancy audio-visual systems and personal computers, and so
on. It is this upscaling that must be ended. Gains in productivity and environmental efficiency
should be used not to support escalating consumption in the affluent societies, but rather to assist
economic growth in the developing countries and provide these countries with more "ecological
space" for their growth.
A slowdown of high consumption for the sake of ending worldwide poverty can be realized
through a social regulation of the global economy. This social regulation should include labor
standards, environmental measures, rules for global capital investments, and a distributive schema
that shifts some of the wealth obtained from globalization from the rich countries to the developing
world. A promising schema is Thomas Pogge's proposal for a dividend to be paid to the global poor
for the extraction of limited resources. To avoid that the social regulation of the global economy
would have a regressive impact on lower-income groups in the affluent societies, a progressive
consumption tax should be adopted with a standard deduction large enough so that these groups
would not have to pay any tax at all. This consumption tax would further slow down upscale
spending.
Appeals to justice alone will not suffice to change high consumption patterns. Such appeals
may work insofar as continuous upscaling is based on competitive acquisition, especially since high
consumers also have in interest in avoiding international conflicts caused by global poverty.
However, upscale consumption also has a hedonic element: It is pleasurable to discover and explore
new goods, develop new desires, create new forms of self-expressions, and the like. It is, therefore,
imperative that simplicity as a lifestyle and value be articulated and promoted.
Attempts to slow down high consumption through a social regulation of the global economy
will meet two institutional limits, the sovereign state and capitalism. In the final instance, justice and
joyful simplicity for all humans may require cosmopolitan democracy and socialism.
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High Consumption and Global Justice

We live in a world of enormous inequality in consumption. On the one hand, there are at
least one billion high consumers, mostly living in the affluent societies, who reside in
climate-controlled homes, travel by car and plane, wear fashionable clothing, and possess so
many consumer products that they routinely discard many still usable goods. On the other
hand, there are around one billion people in the developing countries who have few
possessions and live at the very margin of existence.

They lack minimally adequate

nutrition, health care, housing, and educational opportunities, and their mortality rates at
birth and under-five mortality rates, even after recent gains towards universal childhood
immunizations, are in the range of fifteen to twenty times the rates in affluent countries. 1
There are also many minimal consumers in the developing world with some inadequately
satisfied basic needs. About 1.3 billion people have no access to clean water; 2 billion
people are anemic; and close to half of the world’s people lack basic sanitation. 2 The
enormous global inequality in consumption is reflected in the fact that the 20% of the
world’s people who live in the richest countries account for 86% of all private consumption
spending, while the poorest 20% of the earth's population account for only 1.3%. This gap
has doubled over the past few decades because of steady overall consumption growth in the
affluent nations and slow growth, stagnation, or even decreases in consumption in many
developing countries.3
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High consumers and their governments have a weak record overall in working
directly toward abolishing global poverty. This is especially true of the United States.
Yearly development assistance by the U.S. government has recently decreased, as is the case
for most donor countries, and ranks now at the bottom of all donor countries in terms of the
percentage of the GNP disbursed. Official American aid is around 0.1 % of its GNP, or the
equivalent of about $30 per capita. 4 Private contributions to nonprofit organizations are
about $700 per capita, but less than $15 of this amount goes to development aid. 5 Increased
private capital investment in the global economy has not adequately made up for the
decrease in direct assistance. Foreign investment in developing economies has mostly gone
to a rather limited number of countries, 6 while global capital investment in general has
increased environmental destruction and deepened economic inequality within and among
nations.
High consumption in a world with widespread poverty and deprivation may be
morally questioned along several lines. Some ethicists, following Peter Singer, argue that it
is a serious moral failing not to more extensively relieve the suffering of the global poor
(including minimal consumers with some unfulfilled basic needs) if we can do so by
reducing our spending on luxuries. In my view, this claim has considerable force, but its
proponents have not paid enough attention to the fact that what is most debatable about
American private donations is not the amount of the contributions but rather that its intended
recipients are almost exclusively fellow citizens and their causes. This narrow focus and
prioritizing is morally indefensible in light of the urgency of need of the global poor. It also
conflicts with the commitment of the global community to abolish poverty everywhere.
This commitment was taken on with the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human
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Rights in 1948 and reaffirmed in Principle 5 of the Rio Declaration of 1992 in the context of
the need for environmentally responsible economic growth: “All States and all people shall
cooperate in the essential task of eradicating poverty as an indispensable requirement for
sustainable development, in order to decrease the disparities in standards of living and better
meet the needs of the majority of the people of the world.” Another moral challenge to high
consumption is that it is unjust in that it is a cause of global poverty and a significant
obstacle to its eradication.
My first main purpose in this paper is to elaborate this latter perspective and argue
that justice demands a slowdown of high consumption for the sake of improving the
condition of the developing world's extremely poor people as well as its minimal consumers.
This perspective has received less attention among moral philosophers than the argument
that the mere existence of global poverty imposes a duty of aid on high consumers. One
advantage of the justice perspective is that it provides a stronger moral ground for the duty
of the affluent to reduce global poverty.

More importantly, it shows that just high

consumption demands not merely monetary donations to the global poor, but rather a
restructuring of the global economy as well as fundamental changes in present spending
patterns.
My second main purpose here is to assess whether a call for just consumption is at all
feasible in light of the expectations and motivations of the high consumers in affluent
societies. I will not, or only marginally, discuss here two important related topics: how a
slowdown of high consumption in the rich countries would benefit their own 100 million
economically deprived citizens7 and how affluent consumption in the developing world
worsens the condition of its very poor and minimal consumers. It should be clear, though,
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that some of my critical comments on high consumption in the highly developed countries
apply to affluent consumption in the developing world.

Contemporary High Consumption

What characterizes modern high consumption is upscaling or the continuous raising of the
standards of satisfactory spending. This goes hand in hand with a shifting in people's
perception of what they "really need." The pace of upscaling seems to have increased in
America during the past twenty-five years due to great gains in income and wealth of the
very upper-middle class. Their luxurious and often excessive spending has rapidly raised the
standards of satisfactory consumption for all middle-class consumers. People buy larger
homes, cars with more gadgets, larger televisions, fancier foods, and designer clothes, while
they also have acquired many new products, such as VCRs, microwave ovens, and
computers. Individual incomes on the whole have not kept up with raised expectations,
giving rise to what Juliet B. Schor has described as the "overspent" and "overworked"
American: Middle-class Americans buy more, save less, more often go bankrupt, join the
workforce in greater numbers, have less time for their family, and have ever more inflated
conceptions of what is needed to live the good life. 8 It seems, however, hardly a uniquely
American phenomenon. Rather, although there are significant local and national differences,
upscale spending and higher consumption expectations in conjunction with more work is a
global high-consumption phenomenon.

Environmental and Resource Justice
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Expanding high consumption in the affluent societies brings environmental harms to the
developing countries and places significant ecological constraints on their economic growth
options.

Consider global warming caused by greenhouse gases.

There is still some

disagreement about the scope and reality of this environmental threat, but a conservative risktaking approach is rational here in light of the seriousness and irreversibility of the harms. 9
The expected harms include large permanently flooded land areas, expanding deserts,
reduced or even destroyed harvests, and more frequent droughts and intense storms. These
harms will strike the developing world more often than the affluent nations in the North,
while poor countries will also be least able to take measures, such as the building of sea
walls, against the harmful effects.10 Escalating consumption in the high-income societies,
then, is unjust in that it will primarily benefit the affluent consumers themselves and
disproportionately harm the less developed countries. Moreover, increased consumption in
the less developed countries will hasten global warming and make it more severe. The
injustice here is that the affluent countries are largely responsible for putting the South in this
predicament. The environmental scientist John Lemons states rhetorically: “Who should pay
for the pollution caused in the past and that still affects us now? While present people [in
affluent nations] may not be guilty of causing past pollution, should they accept the
advantages obtained from such past actions without making remuneration for them?”11 So
justice demands at least that the high-income countries significantly decrease their emissions
of greenhouse gases and provide the developing countries on a wide scale with technologies
that minimize such emissions.
This does not mean that we should neglect the environmental impact of population
growth in the developing world. In 1950, the ratio of the population of the affluent industrial
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countries and less developed countries was 1 to 2; it is presently 1 to more than 3; and, it is
expected to be 1 to around 5 within fifty years.12 High consumers in the North still account
for around 50% of carbon dioxide emissions, but their share will become gradually smaller in
light of the population growth alone in the South. 13 In short, the main focus should now be
on reducing the pollution caused by high consumption and on minimizing emission increases
due to improving the standard of living of the global poor. However, sooner or later the
question must be faced whether justice demands that countries with greater than average
population growth should have lower than average per-capita emission quotas.
Similar evaluative comments apply to other threats to the environment and to issues
of resource scarcity and depletion.

Generally speaking, the past environmentally

unsustainable economic growth of the high-income counties has placed ecological and
resource burdens and restrictions on the economic growth options of developing countries
without bringing commensurate benefits. The economic growth of the North has increased
significantly for developing countries the urgency to address such concerns as, for example,
finding substitutions for scarce nonrenewable resources, reducing the use of materials and
fossil energy in production, saving the tropical rainforests, preserving biodiversity, and
avoiding overfishing of the oceans. At the same time, the North has contributed to pollution
and toxic waste problems in the South. The injustice is especially great with regard to the
world's poorest people. As Thomas W. Pogge writes: "While the global [extreme] poor are
… largely excluded from natural resources, condemned to watching helplessly as the affluent
distribute the abundant natural wealth of this planet among themselves, they do get their
proportional share of the burdens resulting from the degradation of our natural environment - a disproportionate share even, in that they lack the knowledge and the means to protect
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themselves.”14 Justice, then, requires that the affluent societies use fewer resources, reduce
their negative impact on the environment, compensate the developing countries and
especially their global poor for worsening their condition, and assist the developing world
financially and technologically in reaching environmentally sustainable economic growth.
This means that high consumers must slow down their consumption.

Against Upscaling

There are two rather different ways of envisioning a slowdown of high consumption. The
first way is that high consumption must be literally reduced so that, where possible, there is a
return to earlier levels of consumption.

The second view is that only the continuous

upscaling of current high consumption must be stopped. The second view seems most
defensible.
Let me explain my reasons for this claim on basis of Richard Rorty’s “Moral
Universalism and Economic Triage.”

This was the opening paper of the UNESCO

Philosophy Forum in 1996. Rorty argues that when the United Nations was created it was
plausible to believe in “We, the people of the United Nations” as a possible future moral
community of all humans, but nowadays it might be self-deceptive or hypocritical to express
belief in this project. Rorty states: “The only way in which the rich [the high consumers] can
think of themselves as part of the same moral community with the poor is by reference to
some scenario which gives hope [for realizing the good life] to the children of the poor
without depriving their own children of hope.” 15 Rorty maintains that we have to face the
grim possibility that there is no such scenario.

Our reality might be more or less an

ecological zero-sum situation: Significant economic improvement of the condition of the
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global poor will necessitate a proportional reduction in the lifestyles of the affluent
consumers. Rorty assumes that the rich consumers will not be prepared to consume less and
so the future might bring, in his word, the economic equivalent of medical triage, an
"economic triage" in which the people living at the margin of existence will become “dead to
us.”16
Rorty seems correct in claiming that the self-identity of affluent consumers and how
they view the good life for their children are too much interwoven with high consumption
patterns to make a significant reduction of their consumption feasible (by their own choice, at
least).

Moreover, he rightly notes that what further counts against a reversal of high

consumption is that the effective functioning of democratic institutions in rich societies
presupposes a high level of consumption in the form of transportation, communication, and
education. Rorty seems, however, overly pessimistic about our ecological predicament and
its future ramifications.

In order to create the "ecological space" for the economic

development of the global poor and their children, it seems only necessary to end upscaling,
not to absolutely reduce high consumption. The gains in energy efficiency, crop yields,
pollution and waste control, productivity, de-materialization, etc., of the past few decades
have been largely absorbed by rapidly upscaling high consumption. It is this trend that must
be ended so that these gains can instead go toward raising the standard of living of all whose
basic needs remain unsatisfied and toward creating the "ecological space" for doing so. More
recycling, less planned obsolescence, and a shift toward more public and less private
spending is also necessary. We must also end that most scientific research is done for and by
the rich (or done by scientists from poor countries working in the laboratories of the
affluent).17 Science and technology should be focussed on enabling sustainable growth
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everywhere and should be much more geared toward the task of ending global poverty. Once
these steps are taken, it may be reasonably hoped that Rorty's economic triage can be avoided
and that the lifestyle of consumers in affluent countries will become more universally
shareable.

Exploitation

The rich-poor divide in our world is partly the result of a history of colonialism and
exploitation. Present high consumers cannot be blamed for the tragic past, but they still do
profit from it and fail to call for changing its continued impact. Certainly, high consumers
can be held responsible for sustaining extreme global economic inequality when better
alternatives are available. 18 The British consumption anthropologist Daniel Miller writes:
“The First World consumer ‘votes’ on a daily basis for cheap goods through the competitive
mechanisms of capitalism forcing down prices.” 19

And “Today…most of the ‘value’

extracted from labor does not take the form of profits, but is manifested in benefits to First
World Consumers.”20 High consumers, then, share in the exploitation of the global absolute
poor and minimal consumers. Granted, Miller overstates his case by claiming that the high
consumer is “global dictator,”21 and he understates the exploitative role played by global
companies. He is right, however, when he says that “today it is the process of consumption
itself that must be engaged…into taking responsibility for the power that it wields without
consciousness, and therefore largely without responsibility.” 22
The exploitation of the global poor is not limited to benefiting from their weak
bargaining position with regard to wages.23

Certainly, below sustenance wages are

objectionable, but equally disconcerting is how global corporations oppose labor organizing,
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force long working hours under inadequate health and safety conditions, and uproot families
and communities by employing in many industries primarily young women. Typically,
global corporations seek to abdicate responsibility for some of the worst abuses, such as child
labor and threats against union organizers, by hiding behind front companies or contractors'
factories. Other exploitative practices are the destruction of local farming by creating large
mono-culture plantations and resource extraction that is under-compensated and
environmentally damaging.

In all cases, high consumers tend to be participants and

beneficiaries, not only because they may be the recipients of some of the corporate profits,
but also because they desire and search for the "best values."
The recent "banana trade war" illustrates some of these dimensions of exploitation
and how high consumers sustain them. 24 The European Union (EU) imports "Euro bananas"
from the Caribbean Windward Islands and other former colonies, as well as "Dollar bananas"
from Guatemala and other Central American countries. The Dollar bananas are produced by
Chiquita, Dole, and Del Monte on huge plantations with cheap labor, poor working
conditions, and frequent pesticide spraying, harming workers and poisoning local wells. The
Euro bananas tend to be produced by small-scale growers under much better environmental
and labor conditions. The production costs of Euro bananas are about three times as high as
those of the Dollar bananas, but the Euro bananas have nonetheless retained a modest share
of the European market thanks to preferred trade agreements.

Chiquita and the U.S.

government have successfully challenged these agreements via the World Trade
Organization (WTO) as unfair trade. On account of the WTO and corporate America, fair
trade means greater profits and cheaper bananas obtained at the cost of labor and the
environment. Once the EU sets aside their trade protections for Euro bananas, it is to be
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expected that Dollar bananas will increase their market share except when in this case
consumers will opt for just consumption and true fair trade rather than for the least expensive
product. All the media attention to the "banana trade war" has given the fair-trade bananas,
especially the pesticide-free variety, a fighting chance.25
In general, high consumers have few opportunities to opt for true fair trade products,
but they also have hardly begun to demand such products and show concern with the
ramifications of their spending choices. High consumers tend to feel that consumption
products made by children in the developing world are morally tainted. However, they have
on the whole not yet adopted the same attitude with respect to consumer products made
under other exploitative conditions such as substandard wages and unsafe working
conditions. It is only when the illusion of innocence on the side of the high consumer with
regard to these practices is destroyed that we may expect change toward a more equitable
global order.
A crucial step in the right direction of reducing the exploitation of labor would be to
tie the production of consumption goods for the global market to a reasonable minimum
wage that would increase with growing productivity. Basic safety and health standards, as
well as limited working hours, in the workplace should also be adopted. In a recent issue of
Dissent, Alice H. Amsden and Takashi Hikino object to the idea of such labor standards.
They claim that foreign workers have hardly supported the idea and for good reasons:
“Cheap, labor-intensive exports to North Atlantic markets have created jobs for millions of
unemployed, landless third world workers. In some countries, these exports have even
provided a stepping stone to serious industrial transformation and economic development. If
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labor standards raise wage costs prematurely … the end result may protect American workers
but at great hardship to the poor countries allegedly being helped." 26
Amsden and Hikino understate the difficulty and scope of labor protest in developing
countries, but, more importantly, they fail to see that the exploited opting for their own
exploitation is typically an aspect of exploitation. Exploitative global capital investment is
better than no investment at all, and income from exploitative labor is better than no income
at all. The real question is whether a viable alternative is available that does not involve
benefiting from the extreme vulnerability of the global poor.

Better wages and work

conditions are viable possibilities, for the claim by Amsden and Hikino that labor standards
may raise wage costs prematurely is implausible. They note themselves that the present
wage gap between workers of rich and poor countries is around twenty to one. 27 So how can
it be premature to raise the extremely low wages -- as if global capital would no longer have
an incentive to use cheap labor if the ratio would be lowered to, say, fifteen to one? Global
capital may even gain in the long run in that better wages will stimulate local markets, 28
while better working conditions will improve productivity. Moreover, it seems implausible
that somewhat increased prices of export goods for high consumers will so greatly affect
their demand that workers in developing countries will lose on the whole.

A Social Regulation of the Global Market

The raising of wages in export industries in developing countries or the betterment of the
working conditions can only be effective if these happen in all markets; for, otherwise, global
capital might simply move to markets with lower wage costs. This is also true of other
measures that should be taken to lessen the injustices of high consumption and corporate

13

capitalism. Two additional types of measures seem most crucial: investment measures and
environmental rules.

These measures together with labor standards can considerably

improve the condition of the extremely poor and minimal consumers in the less developed
world. A rough historical parallel is how the social regulation of national capitalist markets
earlier this century improved the condition of the working class in the industrial societies.
Regulatory rules on global capital investment in developing countries should include
restrictions on subsidies (tax breaks, free land, infrastructural provisions), a worldwide
minimum corporate tax rate, and the right of local communities to be informed about the
impact of outside investment and to refuse this investment when it threatens to destroy their
culture or livelihood or bring unacceptable environmental damage. Global guidelines should
also be developed for compensation to local communities in the case of corporate relocation.
These measures will help to make future investments more just, but it is further necessary to
compensate the global poor for the fact that the affluent nations worsen their condition by
their disproportionate use of limited resources. Here Pogge's proposal of a Global Resource
Dividend (GRD) is attractive.
Pogge's notion of the GRD is based on the premise that the limited resources of the
earth belong to all humans and that, therefore, their use is justified only if all humans gain at
least in some measure in this process. The GRD is the rather minimal share belonging to
world's poor of the value of extracted resources.29 It is to be paid by countries that extract the
resources and to be distributed on a per capita basis to the poorest countries. A GRD in the
order of 5 to 10% on some basic resources would double the income of the poorest quintile
of the world's population. Obviously, this income should be partly used to assist the very
poor in their own economic development. The GRD may also be seen as a way to redress the
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continued negative impact of colonialism and imperialism. Another strength of the GRD is
that it would stimulate resource preservation, and additional environmental benefits could be
obtained by applying the GRD to the use of renewable resources such as water and soil. A
better-known alternative is James Tobin's proposal of taxing international currency
transactions. A Tobin tax a 1/2 percent would raise an amount at least equal to the GRD. It
lacks the environmental benefits of the GRD, but it would be easier to implement. In either
case, what characterizes these measures is that improving the condition of the very poor (and
gradually also the situation of minimal consumers) is built into the very mechanisms of the
global economy. This makes these measures in the long run more suitable for reducing the
injustices of high consumption than would increased private donations or even higher
governmental development aid. The problem is that the latter -- even though presently
indispensable -- are more subject to the fluctuations of political and charitable sentiments and
preferences.

Similarly, the endeavor to expand the market with fair-trade products is

important for raising awareness of exploitation and promoting a social regulation of the
global market, but it cannot be a substitute for the latter.
Other environmental measures are to be taken.

Affluent governments should

eliminate subsidies on environmentally irresponsible conduct and let consumers and
producers pay for the real costs of their choices. Poor countries could gain by allowing them
to lend for payment their fair share of globally allowable pollution and emissions to rich
industrial countries. Due to their unsustainable past development, the rich nations have
acquired an "ecological debt" and should pay most of the costs of the preservation of the
rainforest and other areas crucial to preventing further reduction of biodiversity. It may
further once more be stressed that the rich nations so as to optimize the "ecological space"
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left for the developing countries should provide them with technologies that "leapfrog over
steps in the traditional path followed by industrial countries."30

Is a Slowdown of High Consumption Feasible?

The tenability of the proposal of reducing high consumption through a socially regulated
global market depends on what motivates high consumers in raising their spending. There
are numerous motivations that guide consumption, such as basic needs, self-reward, and
expressing love and care for others. These motivations do not require, however, upscale
spending. Love, say, can be expressed through a simple gift of flowers or giving the latest
model digital camera.
Schor explains continuous consumption growth in terms of an updated version of the
theory of competitive acquisition. She writes: “The penalties of dropping down [along class
lines] are perhaps the most powerful psychological hooks that keep us keeping up.” 31 There
is a certain ambiguity in her motivational account of upscale consumption: Are the
consumers motivated in spending more because they fear that not doing so would mean that
they no longer belong to the right socio-economic group, or are they motivated by outdoing
those who have a lower socio-economic status?32 The latter motivation is morally more
objectionable but must be assumed to guide at least some people's spending behavior in order
to explain growing consumption. Which regard to either motivation, however, a slowdown
of high consumption is tenable if it would not really change anyone's comparative position.
The irrationality of competitive spending is that when all spend more, no one gains, as Schor
does not fail to stress.33 So a slowdown of high consumption for the sake of eradicating
global poverty would be feasible if it would not work regressively for high consumers at the
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lower end of the income spectrum. The social regulation of the global market will raise the
costs of high consumption. One way of avoiding that this would work regressively would be
to adopt a progressive expenditure or consumption tax with a standard deduction that would
be large enough to let those in lower income brackets pay no tax at all. 34 The result would be
that luxurious spending by the upper-middle class and the wealthy would be reduced
significantly, while people in the lower income brackets would not be negatively affected by
ending global poverty. Moreover, the middle of the middle-class would feel considerably
less pressure to engage in more spending because the continuous raising of consumption
standards by the very affluent would be halted.
Jerome M. Segal has recently argued that many middle-class Americans keep on
working and spending so much not because they have raised their consumption standards, but
because there have been increases in the costs of satisfying important needs. Segal shows
that “need-required income" (NRI) has significantly risen in real terms over the past few
decades for transportation, housing, education, and protection against loss of income,
including saving for retirement, while it has remained more or less the same for food,
clothing, and health care. 35 Disagreeing with Segal, what appear as real NRI increases are
partly increased costs due to raised expectations. 36 Still, to the extent that there have been
real increases in the NRI in some areas, it becomes even more essential that people with
lower incomes are not negatively affected by a social regulation of the global economy. A
progressive consumption tax would help less affluent people to meet more easily past NRI
increases because it would raise their real spendable income.

More importantly, the

progressive consumption tax would reduce the occurrence of the phenomenon that the very
affluent by embracing more expensive ways of satisfying their needs gradually force
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everyone else to live more expensively (e.g., we all now need a powerful personal computer
for educational and communicative purposes). It also seems important to increase public
spending as a way of lowering the NRI in such areas as transportation, education, and
economic security. More generally, then, a reduction in global economic inequality requires
less economic inequality within the affluent nations.
A final motivational factor in continuous consumption growth is that it is pleasurable
to discover and explore new goods, develop new desires, and create new forms of selfexpression.

37

In my view, it would be a mistake to deny this hedonic element, but the

question must be posed whether modern consumption does not often undermine the pleasures
of "self-renewal" and whether there are not better avenues for realizing such pleasures.
Surely, the continuous acquisition of new goods comes with many personal costs, ranging
from working long hours to afford the goods to spending much time to upkeep them. In a
word, the possessor of ever-more consumer goods becomes possessed by their demands.
Moreover, what appears as authentic self-expression is all-too-often manufactured desire.
Aggressive marketing and advertising is all-pervasive and sells not only specific products but
the consumerist lifestyle. The good life, it would seem, is not a life centered on pleasures
obtained from accumulation and upscale spending but rather one of just and moderate
consumption with non-materialistic flourishing at its core.
On this account, we should reduce the overriding role of economic activity in our
lives, seek less work with more meaning, and fill our increased leisure time with more wealth
-- not material wealth and goods, but rather the richness of friendship, music, political
activity; conserving, understanding, and enjoying nature; and creating and appreciating
works of art. 38 Some of these goods are not as easily accessible as the good of consuming,
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and this very fact may be another reason for the centrality of consumption in affluent
societies. The joys of non-material goods, however, are longer lasting, more varied, and
offer more opportunity for self-expression. The high turnover and discarding of material
goods in our society suggests the limited depth of the pleasures of acquisition. The good life
with just consumption does not require austerity but rather involves a focus on durable and
aesthetically pleasing goods possessed in moderation.
In sum, the motives behind high consumption do not seem to be such that working
toward a slowdown of consumption for the sake of ending global poverty is an enterprise that
is at the outset doomed to failure. What further gives credibility to this conclusion is that
empirical data convincingly establish that increases in average income over time (beyond
some basic minimum) do not increase people's overall level of happiness.39 What still needs
to be shown (at least, more explicitly) is that high consumers might have reasons for
supporting the project of consumption slowdown or be open to such reasons.
Justice is a first and strong motivational reason. High consumers are at least morally
disturbed by child labor, and through public debate their view of how their consumption is
rooted in injustice can be broadened. A second reason is basic self-interest. Rorty fails to
note that his triage metaphor is misleading in a crucial way. In medical triage, those who are
left to die are near death. They can do nothing to change their fate; they can only cry out in
misery. Economic triage, to the contrary, requires that the affluent live in armed fortresses.
What worsens the potential for conflict is that the high consumption mode of life is marketed
around the world and creates both a desire of emulation and a response of rejection in that the
lifestyle often conflicts with local lifestyles, cultures, and values.40 A peaceful world order is
in the self-interest of the high consumers; it requires less global poverty and economic
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inequality and, ultimately, a vision of the good life that can be universally shared, not only
economically and environmentally, but also culturally. Third, continuous upscaling has
brought costs to the high spenders themselves in terms of human flourishing.

The

phenomenon of the "overspent American" has called forth the phenomenon of the
"downshifting American." The scope of this phenomenon is unclear, but there is at least a
substantive number of Americans who have voluntarily opted for a lifestyle with less
consumption and more free time. 41 This downshifting is much more often motivated by a
desire for less stress and more meaning than by a desire for a less materialistic lifestyle. 42
Still, downshifting involves a turn-away from the high consumption lifestyle and thus is a
fertile ground for starting to build a world in which the moral scandal of consumption mania
amidst widespread and extreme poverty will give way to moderate consumption for all.

The Need for Institutional Change

Attempts to slow down high consumption through a social regulation of the global economy
will meet two institutional limits, the sovereign state and corporate capitalism. The global
implementation of labor standards, investment measures, and environmental rules requires a
vertical dispersal of sovereignty from the state level to both more local and global levels. 43
Consider labor rights.

An effective implementation of these rights necessitates more

democratic workplaces and strong unions; for only then will rights violations not disappear
under the corporate carpets. New international organizations or the strengthening of existing
ones, such as the International Labor Organization, are also needed to set labor standards, to
review violations by global companies, and to enforce compliance. Similar comments apply
to the enforcement of environmental rules or the effective implementation of such economic
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development schemas as the GRD. These measures are incompatible with a strong notion of
state territorial sovereignty as still accepted by the United Nations. Consider Principle 2 of
the Rio Declaration: "States have ... the sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies [as long as they] do not
cause damage to the environments of other States.” The Principle may seem attractive as a
protection against global companies and economic imperialist policies, but it is a doubleedged sword in that it is also antithetical to the GRD and global ecological measures. The
problem is that the Principle grants, in effect, any state the right to waste scarce resources and
diminish biodiversity at will, thereby lessening the economic opportunities and quality of life
of both present and future generations. A socially regulated global economy, then, requires
stronger international institutions. Broad acceptance of such institutions will only emerge
with their democratization. In a word, a slowdown of high consumption suggests the need
for cosmopolitan democracy. 44
Need corporate capitalism be replaced, as well? There is no doubt that growing
consumption is stimulated by capitalism. High consumption countries typically spend one to
two percent of their GNP on advertising, an amount of money that would rapidly eradicate
global poverty if it were used for this goal. Moreover, entrepreneurs and stockholders benefit
greatly from high rates of economic growth. This does not mean, however, that capitalist
economic growth cannot be slowed down through tax measures and be directed toward
sustainable growth and ending global poverty. Looking further ahead, though, ecological
and resource constraints may require a more stationary economic system. Socialism is here a
solution in that worker-controlled companies with profit sharing have much less incentive for
continuous expansion and new product development and offer more opportunity for a leisure-
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work trade-off than privately owned firms. 45 It is also a task and challenge: Contemporary
socialists have paid too little attention to how socialism can be envisioned within a global
economy.
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